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ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XXI APRIL, 1947 NUMBER 2
JURISDICTION BASED ON RESIDENCE
or
"OPEN THE DOOR, RICHARD!"
T aE methods authorized by the Common Law to summon
a defendant to answer a complaint in a civil action were
adopted by the Colonies after the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. They became a part of the Common Law of the thir-
teen original states. The Writ was' called a summons and
an attorney, as an officer of the court, was authorized to issue
and sometimes to direct its service for the purpose of com-
mencing a civil action. Different conditions required dif-
ferent methods of service, ranging from the simplest involv-
ing personal service on a competent adult to the complicated
methods of service by publication. In the latter instances, it
might require several months before the service would be
deemed complete. The powers of an attorney to direct ser-
vice of process were limited to the simplest cases and when
circumstances required resort to service by substitution or
publication an order must first be obtained, issued by a court
or judge and supported by an affidavit or affidavits and es-
tablishing the necessary facts permitting service in one of
these exceptional ways. The order, if issued, then directed
the manner in which the service should be made. However,
our colonial lawyers were not presented with serious diffi-
culties. They "grew up" in their profession with the methods
of the common law well understood. At the time of Magna
Charta (1215) the simplest methods commencing civil ac-
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tions were known to the profession. During the following
560 years or on July 4, 1776 the methods had become defi-
nitely crystallized. While it was expected that new situa-
tions would arise creating jurisdiction, the essentials of this
jurisdiction remained constant. Our colonial lawyers were
thoroughly versed as to what these essentials were.
In the first place, the court rendering the judgment had
to possess the legal power to carry it out. If this power was
not created by the service and the defendant refused to ap-
pear a personal judgment was void. Secondly, the proceed-
ing had to accord with the "Law of the Land or due process
of Law." These two phrases later came to have the same
signification and were employed interchangeably. The mean-
ing, as generally understood, was that every citizen shall
hold his life, liberty and property under the protection of the
general rules which govern society. If a proposed service
did not confer jurisdiction the subsequent judgment was
void, and, on the other hand, if a proposed service might
confer jurisdiction but was a proceeding not in accordance
with the law of the land, the subsequent judgment also be-
came void.
Two simple illustrations may serve to explain these two
important principles. We may assume a summons has been
issued in the New York Supreme Court in an action by
William White against Joseph Black, a resident thereof, to
recover a money judgment. The process server locates the
defendant driving his car on the state road to New Haven,
Connecticut and is unable to overtake Black until after they
pass the state line where the summons is delivered in person
to the defendant. The-summons, having no extra-territorial
effect, its service conferred no jurisdiction or power in the
Supreme Court and the subsequent judgment became a
nullity in New York and every other place under the common
law. We may also assume that Black is found and service
is made personally upon him in New York State where by
reason of his presence the service would be sufficient for con-
ferring jurisdiction. But by reason of false representations
and deceitful contrivances of the plaintiff in the suit or by
one acting in his behalf the defendant has wrongfully been
brought within the state. The ultimate question here is
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whether or not the procedure accords with the requirement
of due process or the law of the land. Blackstone sums it
up in his commentaries to the effect: "That no man shall
be disinherited nor put out of his franchise or freehold and
unless he be duly brought to answer and be forejudged by
course of law; and if anything be done to the contrary, it
shall be redressed, and holden for none."
In which circumstances might an attorney as officer of
the court issue and direct service of the summons on a natu-
ral person? It has previously been observed that the in-
stances were limited to the simple cases where jurisdiction
was established by reason of the defendant's actual presence
in the state. Due process of law did not require an applica-
tion to the court for an order directing service in such in-
stance as long as there was a delivery within the state to the
defendant or the persons designated. Thus, we find due
procedure. Service on an adult defendant could validly be
made by a delivery of a copy of the summons to the adult
person within the state, or secondly, if the defendant were
an infant of the age of 14 years or over, then the service re-
quired a delivery of the summons to the infant and to his
father, mother or guardian, or if there be none within the
state, to the person having the care and control of him, or
with whom he resides or in whose service he is employed.
Thirdly, if the defendant be a person judicially declared to
be incompetent to manage his affairs, of and for whom a
committee has been appointed, the service would be made on
the committee, and also on defendant in person; but the
court in its discretion may make an order dispensing with
the delivery to the defendant in person. Fourthly and under
Section 227 of the Civil Practice Act service might be made,
providing the adult resident defendant has designated an-
other competent resident to accept service for him in his
stead, by delivery to the designee of the summons within the
state.
There were other exceptional methods provided for the
commencement of civil actions. These are the exceptional
methods stated above by an order for substituted service or
an order for publication. The former order could be ob-
tained providing the defendant, a natural person, was a
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resident of the state and: equally important, that the plain-
tiff would be unable, with due diligence, to make personal
service. If these facts satisfied the impartial judge, the order
would provide for the substituted service. In such instance,
the jurisdiction was created by reason of the defendant's
citizenship in the state and due process was secured by con-
forming to the conditions specified in the order. There was
no doubt that such procedure accorded with the Common
Law requirements. The order as to service required that a
copy of the summons as well as the order might be delivered
to a competent person found at the defendant's residence
who would be willing to accept the process. No further ser-
vice in such event on the defendant within or without the
state would be required. Secondly, if the service could not
be made in this way, then by affixing to the outer door of
defendant's residence a copy of the summons and order and
immediately thereafter mailing duplicate copies to the de-
fendant at his address. Those acts done within the state
were the essential ingredients in establishing the jurisdic-
tion. Such procedure was very effective, for in event of de-
fendant's default, the plaintiff might have a personal judg-
ment for the full amount of his .claim and such judgment
would be recognized in New York as well as any state or
country following the common law.
The second method of reaching the defendant provided
for service by publication. Here the first important problem
presented to the state was that of jurisdiction. It was rec-
ognized that whatever methods of service were prescribed it
was essential that they validly -confer power on the court to
adjudicate rights and declare liabilities. Three general types
of actions might confer this jurisdiction based on three dif-
ferent grounds. 'First, in matrimonial actions where the
plaintiff sought to have its status as a resident declared, it
was recognized that the sovereign alone, had such jurisdic-
tion. Therefore, in these types the power vested in the court
without dispute. Secondly, in actions where the complaint
demanded judgment that defendant be excluded from a vest-
ed or contingent interest in or lien upon specific real or per-
sonal property within the state the power of the court was
recognized because the property was situated here and the
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action was strictly one in ren. Thirdly, where the complaint
demanded a money judgment and was one in personam it
might be made quasl in rem by providing for an attachment
and a levy made on property within the state. If defendant
defaulted after service, the court, having acquired jurisdic-
tion to the extent of the attached property, had power to
create the plaintiff's rights thereto.
Therefore, the second important problem confronting
the state was the nature of the notice to be given the defen-
dant. It has already been noted in the case of substituted
service that the order permitting the same provided for a
procedure in accordance with due process and in enacting
the statute for an order of publication, a procedure was fol-
lowed which had been adopted by the common law. It per-
mitted a service by publishing in two newspapers, etc., or a
service of the defendant personally outside the state with
summons and verified complaint in lieu of publication. Since
the jurisdiction of the court was established in one of the
three instances stated above, it was recognized that there
might be many instances where an order of publication might
be an unnecessary and costly proceeding. The sufficiency
of the service or required notice would be sustained by serv-
ing personally the defendant outside the state without ob-
taining an order of publication. This was the practice pro-
vided for under, Civil Practice Act Section 235, prior to its
amendment. The defendant would be sufficiently apprised
of the action pending against him and these three methods
of service were the law and are the law today.
On September 1, 1947 the legislature by amending Sec-
tion 235 has completely revolutionized our procedure in the
case of money demands against residents of the state. Not
that the section does omit any of the former provisions but
it is argued the addition must have this effect.
The law reads today:
Sec. 235. PERSONAL SERVICE WITHOUT THE STATE WITHOUT
ORDER.
Where the defendant is a resident of the state and the complaint
demands judgment for a sum of money only, and in any case specified
in section two hundred thirty-two of this act, the summons may be
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served without an order, upon a defendant without the state in the
same manner as if such service were made within the state, except
that a copy of the verified complaint must be annexed to and served
with the summons, and that such service must be made by a person
or officer authorized under section two hundred thirty-three of this
act to make service without the state in lieu of publication. Proof
of service without the state without an order shall be filed within
sixty days after such service. Service without the state without an
order is complete ten days after proof thereof is filed. (Am. L. 1939
ch. 18, in effect Sept. 1; L. 1946 ch. 144, in effect Sept. 1.)
The italicized matter is the new matter added to the section
and the law is too recent to find judicial interpretation as
to the effect and constitutionality of the change. However,
some enlightenment may be gained by quoting the interview
between Richard, a citizen of New York, and Mr. L., his
lawyer. There can be no objection that the matter is in-
competent as confidential or privileged because the writer
was present throughout the interview.
RICHARD: I have come to ask your advice concerning
the recent addition made to Section 235 of the Civil Practice
Act which -became effective on September 1, 194-7.
L.: Well, the law is interpreted by some to provide
that in an action wherein the complaint demands solely
money damages against a resident of New York, the sum-
mons and complaint may be served on the defendant per-
sonally without the state without first procuring an attach-
ment and levy on his property within the state.
RICHARD: Just what protection do I lose by this
change?
L.: If an attachment and levy were conditions prece-
dent to the service outside the state the plaintiff would be
required to satisfy the -court that defendant has departed
or is about to depart with intent to defraud his creditors or
to avoid the service of a summons or keeps himself concealed
within the state with like intent.
RICHARD: Have I not that protection now?
L.: Of course not, for an attachment and levy are not
required.
RICHARD: What other protection do I lose?
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L.: The warrant might issue, if the court was satisfied
by affidavits that you had removed property with intent to
defraud your creditors or had assigned, disposed of or
secreted property with like intent.
RICHARD: Well, I would be a heel if I tried that and
it would be only fair if I were guilty. But, as you have said,
I am not entitled to such privilege today. Are there any
other privileges I lose?
L.: Yes. If the action is based on contract and you
are charged with fraud in contracting or incurring the lia-
bility the court might permit an attachment of your property.
RICHARD: I think such law would be just and fair.
L.: Yes, and if you made a false financial statement,
by reason of which the plaintiff extended credit to you which
you now refuse to pay, an attachment and levy might issue.
RICHARD: Do I lose any other protection?
L.: Yes, in order to obtain the warrant, the plaintiff
must furnish an undertaking.
RICHARD: What does this provide?
IL.: Well, if you vacate the warrant or succeed in the
action, the damages you have suffered will be paid.
RICHARD: Are there any other privileges that are lost?
L.: Yes, where the attachment is required and you do
not appear, then the recovery is limited only to the property
attached.
RICHARD: How does it work now, should I default?
L.: Now the plaintiff will recover the full amount of
his claim. You see the law does not depend on a quzas! in renm
action.
RICHARD: But in every instance I'm a wrongdoer, and
as a citizen I should be amenable to the law. But if I am
present and can be served personally without trouble or ex-
pense, or let us assume, I have filed a designation and ser-
vice might be easily made during my absence then why should
I be treated like a criminal?
L.: Some lawyers say that as a citizen you owe your
state a duty.
RICHARD: You don't mean a duty to be a criminal?
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L.: No, but a duty to defend, whatever may be the na-
ture of the action.
R IHARD: Does this law extend to non-residents?
L.: Oh no. A non-resident owes our state no duty.
Therefore our state must grant him every protection includ-
ing an attachment and seizure.
RICHARD: Although he does nothing for my state, he
must be accorded every protection known to the law.
L.: Certainly!
RICHARD: Can you explain why Governor Dewey whom
I so admire, would ever allow such a statute to become the
law?
L.: Why that is perhaps difficult to explain for the fact
is that the Governor did veto the law.
RICHARD: He did veto the law? Why?
L.: He thought the action should be based on an attach-
ment and levy.
RICHARD: That's just what I think. Yet you tell me
it is the law. Will you explain that one?
L.: The Judicial Council of the state explains that the
objection has been corrected by it.
RICHARD: But I don't see how a thing is corrected if
the evil persists. Who is this Judicial Council to whom you
refer?
L.: You must have heard of the Judicial Council. It
proposes new laws to "improve the old." Whenever the legis-
lature enacts their suggestions into law, it causes the foot-
note, "Amendment was recommended by Judicial Council"
to be subscribed.
RICHARD: Oh! It is something like "Tested and ap-
proved by Good Housekeeping."
L.: W"ell, there is not a conclusive presumption yet
attached to their suggestions. The courts still exercise their
powers of judicial review.
RICHARD: It strikes me that I should get so far away
that it would be impossible to serve me.
L.: If you did that, then all the protection as a citizen
would be'reinstated in you.
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RICHARD: I can't follow you. Please explain.
L.: If you cannot be personally served outside of the
state, then service must be made by an order of publication.
Before such order can be granted an attachment and levy
are requisites. That returns your former protection.
RICHARD: In song, I never was compelled to open my
door!
(Poor Richard of the Empire State dejectedly leaves
L.'s office.)
Certain, one is, that he failed to understand Mr. L.'s
reference to judicial review.
IV. TAPLEY.
